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Introducing Inroads 15

DESPITE THE GROWING NUMBER OF CANADIANS WHO HAVE ROOTS in Asia, Africa and Latin America, Canada's connection with Europe – on economic, political, cultural, intellectual and kinship levels – remains strong. This is especially true of the Inroads editorial board:

one of its members teaches in Sweden for part of each year, another recently spent a year in Paris, and a third is currently living in Ireland. These ties, both personal and societal, are reflected in this issue of Inroads.

The theme section looks at Europe as it confronts three related crises: Can Europe integrate large numbers of Muslim immigrants? Can the European Union retain a unity of purpose as it expands to 25 members? Can European governments fiscally sustain generous social programs in the face of economic and demographic challenges? In France, Riva Kastoryano examines the conditions behind the controversial law banning the Islamic veil and other religious symbols; three knowledgeable Canadians

respond. In Sweden, economist Richard Murray explains why the country's renowned welfare state needs to make some radical adjustments if it is to survive. In the Netherlands, Paul Lucardie looks at the spectacular rise of Pim Fortuyn's populist movement – and its collapse after Fortuyn was murdered. In the United Kingdom, Charlie Jeffery assesses the state of the new institutions established with devolution of power to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, while John Loughlin highlights the European dimension of this process.

Other articles have a European connection as well. One of Sweden's most eminent journalists, Hans Bergstrom, offers an out-

sider's insights into the U.S. election campaign. Alexander Freund reflects on how memory has shaped German immigrants' experiences in North America. And contributors to the Inroads listserv compare the different ways in which Canada, the United States and Europe have managed cultural diversity. Elsewhere in the issue:

- Arthur Milner offers a modest proposal for resolving the Israel-Palestine dispute, to stimulate discussion on a topic that we will cover more fully in our next issue;

- Robert Whelan, Richard Vengroff and Pierre Joncas report on what's at stake in the possible partial reversal of Montreal's "One Island, One City" municipal merger;
- Steve Patten reviews three books on the intense ambition and corporate-friendly Liberalism that brought Paul Martin to the Prime Minister's Office;
- John Richards pays tribute to the late Claude Ryan, and translates an excerpt from Ryan's testament.

— Bob Chodos

Inroads European painting series

Advocates of European federalism talk of "an ever greater union." If there is a domain where – despite conflicts over language, religion and territory – a shared European sensibility exists, it is the domain of art. An educated Spaniard, like an educated Finn, instantly recognizes meaning and importance in a village scene as painted by Brueghel or an impressionistic landscape by Turner.

Running through our section on Europe is an annotated survey of a few European artists, from Albrecht Dürer in the early Renaissance to Dadaist Max Ernst. Looking at these paintings and reading Sabine Bartel's notes is one way to appreciate that there is more to Europe than squabbles over voting rules for the European Commission.

— John Richards

The selection and notes are by Sabine Bartel, who is in her final year of study at the Emily Carr Institute of Art and Design in Vancouver.



No more negotiations

A modest proposal to resolve the Israel-Palestine impasse

IN 1947, THE UNITED NATIONS CALLED for the partition of the British Mandate of Palestine into “Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem.” Resolution 181 divided the Mandate into predominantly Arab areas and predominantly Jewish areas. The Jews accepted the partition resolution, but the Arabs did not. When the Jews proclaimed the State of Israel after the British withdrew in 1948, the neighbouring Arab states invaded and were defeated. In the process, Israel redrew and enlarged its borders beyond what had been designated by the UN. At the same time, Egypt and Jordan occupied the adjacent, “predominantly Arab areas”; they did not, however, create an independent Arab state.

In a 1967 war, Israel captured the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan and the Golan Heights from Syria. The UN called for “withdrawal of Israeli armed

forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict” (UN Security Council Resolution 242), though no date for withdrawal was specified.

After another war in 1973, the UN called for “the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242.” It also resolved that “immediately and concurrently with the ceasefire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East” (Security Council Resolution 338). Despite some dispute concerning the timing and extent of Israeli withdrawal, these three UN resolutions, culminating in Resolution 338, outlined a widely accepted framework for the pursuit of “a just and durable peace”:

- two states;
- the pre-1967 borders (perhaps with minor modifications); and
- negotiations.

The immediate causes of the 1967 war are, like just about everything concerning the Israel-Palestine conflict, contentious. But the international community has been more or less unanimous in its agreement that, under international law, Israel does not get to keep the territories it occupied.

The “green line” separating pre-1967 Israel from the occupied territories has disappeared from many Israeli maps, and more than 400,000 Israeli citizens have established homes in the occupied territories. Israel annexed East Jerusalem in 1967 and the Golan in 1981. The Sinai, following a bilateral peace treaty, was returned to Egypt in 1979. As for the West Bank and Gaza, they have not been annexed but remain in Israel’s possession, 37 years after the 1967 war.

Suggestions about how to resolve this impasse fall into three main categories, which I shall call the extremist, the idealist and the accommodationist.

Nationalist and religious extremists insist on a single state in Israel and the territories, composed of – or at least controlled by – Jews or Arabs, depending on who is doing the insisting.

Idealists also support a single state, but they imagine Jews and Arabs living democratically and harmoniously together. The idealist position gets little attention, but it does exist, and even has an organization: the Association for One Democratic State in Palestine/Israel (www.one-democratic-state.org).

Accommodationists want two states, one Palestinian, one Jewish, as envisioned by the United Nations. Major Palestinian organizations and recent Israeli governments have publicly accepted the two-state solution. The international community has, notwithstanding opposition from a few Arab countries,

lined up overwhelmingly behind the two-state solution as outlined in UN resolutions 242 and 338. Given the enormous support for this solution, it seems odd that it has not yet been reached.

There have been, in fact, periods of great optimism. But such optimism now seems no more than a component of a larger pattern of recurring failure. Moreover, the price of failure is growing. The highest price has been paid by the Israelis and Palestinians, but politicized Islam has increased the geopolitical importance of the dispute. So long as the Palestine-Israel conflict remains, it provides endless propaganda to Islamic extremists. The international community cannot sit patiently while the Israeli-Palestinian impasse remains a tinder box for explosions around the world.

It is time for the international community to admit that the guidelines of UN resolutions 242 and 338 – two states, the pre-1967 borders, negotiations – have failed.

Unfortunately, there is no serious alternative to the two-state solution. The one-state solution would entail a human catastrophe, no matter who ended up in control of the state that remained. The idealist version is unworkable for the foreseeable future. And even if the pre-1967 borders may no longer be appropriate, there is no indication that revised borders will be any more acceptable to Palestinian and Israeli political leaders. The recent Geneva Accord, for example, the product of unofficial negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, reached detailed compromises on borders and other contentious issues, but was categorically dismissed by the Israeli government and extremist Palestinian groups.

Which brings us to the method envisioned by Resolutions 242 and 338: nego-

tiations. It is clear that negotiations aimed at creating two states in Israel-Palestine have failed and are failing, and there is no reason to imagine future success.

The reason for this failure should by now be obvious: negotiations between Israel and Palestine are fatally vulnerable to sabotage by opponents of the two-state solution.

The pattern of failure is boring in its predictability. As negotiations begin to look productive – usually under a Labour-led government in Israel – Palestinian terrorists opposed to the two-state solution attack Israeli civilians. In response, Israel announces that there will be no negotiations until the violence ends – a condition that no Palestinian leadership can meet. Israel may also, and often does, respond with violent reprisals and by closing its borders to Palestinian migrant workers. The international community urges restraint on Israel's part, a Palestinian crackdown on terrorists, and the resumption of negotiations. (Of late, Israel has been building its "security fence," something new for the international community to decry.) Eventually, relative calm is restored and negotiations resume. The cycle of hope and failure continues, and the longer it does, the more cynical or numb participants and onlookers become.

It is time to move beyond useless calls for negotiations. But to what?

In a recent column, Thomas L. Friedman calls Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip "an urgent necessity" (New York Times, January 18, 2004). Friedman devotes most of his column to explaining why such a withdrawal is in Israel's best interests. His arguments are lucid and compelling, but there is no reason to think that he will convince Israel's leaders when so many others have failed.



Ideally, he writes, "this withdrawal should be negotiated along the Clinton plan. But if necessary, it should be done unilaterally. This can't happen too soon, *and the U.S. should be forcing it*" (my emphasis).

What does he mean, "forcing"? No doubt he is choosing his words carefully; he must intend something other than "advising" or "urging" or "strongly encouraging" – but he doesn't elaborate, nor does he give any time limit for negotiations. Let us make the question explicit: Should the U.S. force Israel to withdraw from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip? Friedman supported the recent U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. I did not, and I would rephrase the question: Should the international community use force to compel the two-state solution?

The answer, I am convinced, is yes. On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. On that same day, the UN Security

Council adopted resolution 660, calling "upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences." More resolutions, threats, sanctions and ultimatums followed. But five months after the invasion of Kuwait, an international force led by the United States ejected Iraq from Kuwaiti territory. No one asked Iraq under what conditions it would return Kuwaiti territory, or how much territory Iraq was prepared to give up. No one consulted Kuwait on how much territory it should get. And while quite a few individuals and some countries suggested that Iraq be given more time to comply – or that war must be avoided at all costs – the international community said, through the United Nations and with leadership from the U.S., "Get out now."

Let us agree that there are differences between Israel and Palestine in 1967 and Iraq and Kuwait in 1990. Israel was not solely culpable in 1967, as was Iraq in 1990; Palestinians were not blameless. Still, it has been 37 years. It is time to say to Palestinians and Israelis, "You've had long enough to work this out among yourselves. We're taking over now."

It is time to establish an international commission to determine how many and which Israeli settlers will have to leave the territories, how many and which Palestinians will be allowed to return to family homes in Jaffa, Haifa and Jerusalem (and what, if any, compensation others will receive), what to do with Jerusalem and, of course, where the international border will go. The international commission might well begin with the Geneva Accord's detailed compromise. And of course, while the international commission is meeting and planning, Palestinians and Israelis will be free

to negotiate their own solution. But in the absence of a bilateral solution, and after a short deadline, an international force should invade, force compliance with the commission's determinations, and leave troops behind to maintain compliance and ensure the security of both sides.

We should not be naive. The possibility of an international armed force entering the Middle East to confront Israeli soldiers and perhaps civilians – to put it bluntly, the prospect of a largely gentile army battling Jews, 60 years after the Holocaust – is the stuff of nightmares. But to refuse to act for that reason would be worse: it would mean accepting that the international community may fight and kill Arabs or Serbs, but not Jews.

What are the chances that the United Nations will authorize the use of force in the Israel-Palestine dispute? Currently, of course, the United States would veto any such proposal. The point, however, is to move the argument forward. You can force people to the table but you can't make them negotiate in good faith. As a first step, we who seek a solution to the Middle East impasse must stop calling for futile negotiations. We must debate, and begin the process of gathering support for, the use of force.

The hope, of course, is that such force will be unnecessary – that the mere threat of force will lead to serious and fruitful negotiations. But negotiations are not working. Their continuing failure breeds cynicism and despair, and the impasse puts the world at risk. It is time for the international community, through the United Nations, to act. If it refuses, it may be time for the United States to lead a second – and, I would argue, more justified – "coalition of the willing" into the Middle East.

— Arthur Milner

Remembering Claude Ryan

WITH CLAUDE RYAN'S DEATH ON FEBRUARY 9, Quebecers – and all Canadians – lost a man of great lucidity, stamina and generosity. As well as, if not better than, René Lévesque, Ryan articulated the goals of the Quiet Revolution. If any one document can be claimed to do so, the set of constitutional reforms laid out in his 1980 “Beige Paper” epitomized the political aspirations of his generation of Quebec leaders.

Ryan sought throughout his life to define *le juste milieu* – between conformity to his Catholic faith and the compromises required of a very public life; between academic abstraction and *observations ponctuelles* in the daily press; between advocacy for Quebec nationalism and defence of Canadian federalism; between support for the liberating changes of post-1960 Quebec and hope that those liberated from the constraints of the parish would remain faith-

ful to the wisdom of the Church; between the need for a generous welfare state and a puritan sense of the duty of the individual to work and be useful to society.

A convinced Quebec nationalist, Ryan nonetheless sought out and communicated with Canadians across the country. This was how I came, in the last five years of his life, to know him. He attended a seminar I gave at the University of Montreal, and afterward he joined us for a modest lunch at a restaurant along nearby Côte-des-Neiges.

Readers of Inroads had the opportunity to appreciate Claude Ryan's writings. In 1999, he used Inroads as means to communicate to Canadians his critique of the Social Union Framework Agreement, a document that in his opinion – and mine – flouted the spirit of Canadian federalism. The next year we published, in translation, an epistolary exchange between André



ILLUSTRATION MICHEL GARNEAU. REPRODUCED FROM LE DEVOIR WITH PERMISSION.

Burelle and Ryan on what is and what should be Quebec's role in the Canadian federation.

Ryan was attracted to St. Augustine's effort to reconcile Christian faith with active participation in the affairs of the world. In 2001 we published Ryan's essay on the appropriate role of the Christian engaged in what he described as *le rude métier* of politics. Knowing his passionate interest in defining a just compromise on language policy, we invited him to review Marie McAndrew's *Immigration et diversité à l'école* for the Winter/Spring 2003 issue. Written by an education professor, this book on teaching the children of immigrants won the Donner

Foundation prize for best policy book of 2002.

The last time we met was for coffee on the second floor of the McGill University bookstore, in the spring of 2003. As always, he was working. He had just finished delivering a lecture in a course he was offering on Catholic social thought. I introduced him to my brother and my niece, a McGill student. He had had problems with his stomach, he allowed, but he thought that his health was now restored. It was not.

— John Richards

I leave this world with regret ...

An excerpt from Claude Ryan's final testament

Read by his son André Ryan at his funeral on February 13

Translated by John Richards

I LEAVE THIS WORLD WITH REGRET, FOR I liked very much living in it. I leave it with sincere gratitude for those whose friendship, support and advice allowed me to lead a full and generally happy life. I beg the indulgence of those to whom I gave offence by my words and deeds, and I ask God to free me from all thoughts of bitterness or vindictiveness directed at those with whom I have had quarrels or disagreements. I pray God to pardon me for the many times when my acts and thoughts strayed from His will. I humbly ask Him to accept me in His peace.

I thank the Roman Catholic Church for having given the moral and spiritual framework without which my fragile being would often have wavered. The Catholic Church is above all a teacher about life. Better than any individual, it knows the aspirations and the secrets of the human heart. The influences that opened to me the richness of Christianity began with lessons learned from my family, school and parish. They also include my participation in Catholic Action

movements, my study of church history and frequent and assiduous reading of church documents and of spiritual and religious writers. I cite also the example of countless priests, religious and lay people who entered my life at one moment or another.

I would have liked to spend more time with the Bible. Only in my years of retirement did I find the necessary scientific and religious foundations to do so.

It is principally to the Catholic Church that our people owe our having survived, with honour and dignity, the many trials to which we have been subjected. My deepest wish is that, despite the changes of recent decades, our people find happiness and liberty in the spiritual and moral teachings of Jesus Christ, and especially the teaching of respect for life. These teachings find their most honest expression, in my opinion, in the magisterium and ministry of the Catholic Church. But while this is my personal conviction, I have witnessed with joy the growing openness of the Catholic Church

under recent popes, and especially under John Paul II, toward other Christian denominations and all religions that seek to know, honour and love God. I leave this life hoping that the world's religious families will move toward greater unity.

I thank the varied movements, associations, institutions, and organizations that, in the course of my adult life, enabled me to be useful to our society and to participate in its development. I am especially grateful to the educational institutions with which I have been associated; each of them shaped me. I say the same for the Catholic Action movements, an extraordinary school for *la vie engagée*. At Le Devoir I learned to grasp the deep roots of our people's attachment to preserving their identity. I also appreciate the many, many religious, social, cultural and economic associations to which I belonged.

The Quebec Liberal Party has displayed remarkable historical continuity and has repeatedly been able to renew its vigour. Its capacity for renewal has been based on its respect for the values of liberty and justice, its identification with the aspirations and struggles of our people and its political pragmatism. I wish to thank the people of my constituency, Argenteuil, whose faithful and generous support was indispensable to my political career. In the National Assembly and the government of Quebec, I was proud and honoured to serve for a number of years in the company of men and women who represented with dignity the rich diversity of our society. And finally, I look back with gratitude on the many Canadian institutions – journals, universities, governments, the Order of Canada – that, while not necessarily sharing my views, showed confidence in me or at least listened to me during my professional and political career.

I leave this life hoping that Quebec will continue to be part of the Canadian political collectivity. While I am very conscious of the difficulties experienced by Quebecers in trying to change the federation, I am convinced that it is in the best interest of Quebec and the rest of Canada to pursue their destiny within a common political framework. Canadian federalism seems to me a more propitious context in which to develop the values of liberty and mutual respect without which the linguistic duality and cultural diversity characteristic of Canada – and, to a growing extent, Quebec – will not be able to survive and prosper. Federalism, in my opinion, offers better guarantees for the preservation of the cultural values of each of our two founding societies than separation into two countries.

In the case of Quebec, however, these guarantees would be more secure if the rest of the country more explicitly accepted its distinct character, and the legitimate aspirations flowing from that character. I say this with conviction but not fanaticism or bitterness, and with respect for divergent or opposing opinions. I recognize that the final word on this matter must come at the appropriate time from the judgement of the people, freely and clearly expressed.

My final wish is that governments, political parties, the many associations engaged in public life, the media and the public take more interest in the fate of the weakest in our society. True democracy must reconcile the values of freedom with those of social justice. The gap between the poor and the rich has widened too much in recent years. There are too many unjustifiable inequalities in the distribution of wealth and power. This growing inequality is a formidable challenge to those engaged in politics. ■

Haitian wheels continue to spin

IN THE ARTICLE I WROTE LAST YEAR FOR Inroads (“Haiti: The Island’s Wounded Wing,” Inroads 13, Summer/Fall 2003), I concluded that “Haiti is mired in the worst kind of poverty, spinning its wheels.” By contrast, the neighbouring Dominican Republic has made impressive progress over recent decades. Again to quote myself, “It would fly in the face of every trading nation’s interests to sit back and let the weight of Haitian poverty crush the Dominican progress.”

Since I wrote that article, Haitian political wheels have continued to spin – and have dug in deeper. In March of this year an armed rebellion toppled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. What should the international community – by which I mean the United Nations and, in particular, the United States, France and Canada – do now? The answer can be found by looking at what it did the last time it intervened in Haiti. The lesson is obvious: there is no quick fix.

In 1994, UN troops took over from 20,000 Americans who had just pushed out

the military dictator, Lt.-Gen. Raoul Cedras. Then they escorted back Aristide, who had fled in 1991 after a coup. It was a hopeful time. Aristide, once a priest, was the first fairly elected leader in the nation’s 190-year history. He talked like a visionary – a man of the people. He seemed obsessed with the need to be honest and fair.

Canada was involved big-time with Aristide’s return. Our foreign affairs minister of the day, André Ouellet, flew with him to Haiti in a show of solidarity. Canada donated 50,000 shovels – a modest but practical gift to farm families that had nearly starved during a three-year trade embargo imposed by the U.S., France and others to put pressure on the military dictator. We also reopened schools and hospitals. Our soldiers patrolled the streets, with colleagues from Jamaica, Bangladesh and a dozen other countries. And 100 Mounties helped out, keeping an eye on the work of those deemed to be the best of the old regime’s police officers, who were allowed to stay on the job, while training recruits for what was to be

Haiti’s first honest and professional police force. Indeed, reform of all aspects of Haiti’s corrupt, dysfunctional justice system became Canada’s focus for the nearly three years we stayed.

It didn’t take a lot of effort then to maintain order. It was a time before drug thugs turned Haiti into a major transshipment point, and there were few weapons around. Besides, order was something most Haitians craved. Though Aristide asked the UN troops to leave, they were made to feel welcome by most of the people.

In 1997, the Canadians and their UN colleagues decided to go home. Aristide’s dark side began to surface. He led Haiti down a slippery slope of political corruption. By last year, his government had the shameful distinction of being ranked the third most corrupt in the world by Transparency International. He and the Chimères, his armed supporters, embraced violence, intimidation and fraud as political tools to maintain power. All of the reforms launched by Canada and its UN partners fell apart.

The lesson to draw from this failure is that Canada and other countries pulled out before they finished the job. Prime Minister Paul Martin understands as much. Speaking last March, he said, “The international community left Haiti prematurely, and we saw what happened. The international community must not make that mistake again. And Canada is going to stay there and make sure this does not happen.”

But there is no sign that the PM means what he says. Indeed, Canada’s contingent of 450 soldiers is only half what we sent in 1994, and they are to stay only three months. Although Martin has committed Canada to a year’s involvement, officials in Ottawa are already making excuses about not having

enough troops to replace the 450 when their tour is up – though we may send some a few months later.

If the 1994 intervention was too little and too short to do lasting good, what does Martin expect to accomplish with a much flimsier effort this time? And if the UN again leaves Haiti on its own before a competent, democratic government is in place, what are the country’s prospects?

The past suggests they are dismal.

Economically, Haiti has been mired in misery for decades. Despite billions in aid from North America and Europe (nearly \$500 million from the Canadian government alone in the 1980s and 1990s) and countless millions in private charity, it still ranks a dismal 150th on the United Nations Development Programme’s quality of life index.

In the late 1970s, when we began to get serious about aid, Haiti was an awful place. Men lived, on average, just 51 years, and women not much longer. Per capita GDP peaked at US\$3,200 (measured in purchasing power parity terms). There was only one doctor for every 10,500 people and less than one hospital bed per 1,000. People got, on average, just 84 per cent of the food needed to stay healthy.

By 2002, after all that spending, men were living to an average age of 47 years and women to 50. Per capita GDP (again measured in purchasing power parity terms) had declined by 40 per cent and was less than US\$1,900. This is one of the world’s worst economic performances – equivalent to the dismal economic outcomes in many sub-Saharan African countries. There has been a slight improvement in the ratio of doctors to population, but a worsening in the ratio of hospital beds. And people were



A young boy stands on the farm his parents own in Verrettes, but one only has to look at the rocky terrain and balding mountains behind him to understand this isn't fruitful land. JULIE OLIVER PHOTO

getting just 83 per cent of the food they needed to stay healthy.

The prospects for Haiti's quality of governance might be even worse.

Haiti is the Western Hemisphere's second oldest republic, its independence dating from 1804 when its black slaves threw out the French, but it has never once enjoyed a stable democratic government. Its first 150 years saw 102 coups, wars or revolts. Only one of its 22 leaders ever served a full term.

The country had stability, but not democracy, from 1915 to 1934 while it was occupied by the United States, and again during the Duvalier family dictatorship from 1957 to 1986. Since the overthrow of the Duvaliers there has been an unending succession of iffy elections and forcible oustings – three in 1988 alone.

Aristide's 1990 victory came in what was seen as the country's first fair and open election, but the army deposed him just a year

later. Tragically, since 1994, he has betrayed the trust of the countries that restored him to power and of the people who first elected him. He has maintained power through violence, intimidation and electoral fraud. He has done little or nothing to enhance the public good – for example, public expenditure on education has fallen from 1.4 per cent of GDP in 1990 when he was first elected to 1.1 per cent by 2000. He has presided over the establishment of a huge narcotics trade – perhaps the only growth industry in Haiti – and he stands accused of corruptly amassing personal wealth at the expense of his people.

The interim government cobbled together since Aristide's departure in March appears to be made up of people who have integrity and some credibility in the country. But the levers of power they have to operate are weak. The country is so poor – not only in terms of per capita income but also in infrastructure, competent personnel

and functional institutions – that it is doubtful they can do much no matter how well intentioned they may be. The order that is now imposed by outside forces is fragile, and the armed thugs who overran Aristide's regime in the early spring of 2004 prior to the intervention may act again. Until it gets on a stronger financial and democratic footing, Haiti will need outside help – money and expertise – to maintain what little infrastructure it has and to deliver its very basic services.

If it does not get that help and it falls apart again, the consequences will not be just internal to Haiti. They may affect much of the hemisphere.

The 1994 U.S.-led intervention was in large measure motivated by concerns about boatloads of Haitians trying to make the 1,000-kilometre crossing to Florida, and there is renewed concern about a mass exodus. A warning last fall from the Canadian military about instability in Haiti noted that desperate migrants could become a problem for Canada too. Yet most Haitians do not have the resources to get to the U.S. or even to try to set out for Canada. The countries at greatest risk of being overwhelmed by fleeing Haitians are in the Caribbean. On the front line is the Dominican Republic, which shares the island of Hispaniola with Haiti.

Haitians already cross the long, wild frontier to the Dominican Republic more or less at will. At any given time, about a million of them – one Haitian in eight – are living and working among the eight million Dominicans next door. The Dominicans need many of these workers. In recent years, their economy has, for the most part, been bounding ahead. And Haitians do the grunt work in many key industries, notably agriculture (rice, coffee, sugar) and construction.

Although the Dominican Republic's per capita income is nearly four times that of Haiti, its economy is still fragile. It is in chronic danger of being overrun by more poor Haitian migrants than its rudimentary social services can support. If the flow of migrants turns into a flood because Haiti's economy worsens, political instability may erupt across the island.

The Dominican government of Hipolito Mejia has sought to share its progress by building metaphorical bridges across the border (See "Hispaniola: Two Wings of the Same Bird," *Inroads*, Summer/Fall 2003). But, there is a long, nasty history of wars and flareups between the two countries extending from the 19th century well into the 20th, and there continue to be reports of sporadic abuses of migrant workers' rights. Traces of deep-rooted xenophobia can be found in some Dominicans. And an uncontrolled flood of dirt-poor migrants, and the problems they will inevitably bring, could push even the more tolerant Dominicans over the edge.

To end on a note of faint optimism, this threat might, in the end, be a trigger for the developed world to commit to actually solving Haiti's problems. A modern mantra of intervention is that it is warranted to stabilize any government committed to democracy, human rights and policies to help the poor. Haiti's government fails on all three counts. But the Dominicans pass these tests rather well. So if the world does not care to intervene on behalf of Haitians, among the most downtrodden people on earth, perhaps it will to protect the progress of a bright spot in the developing world.

— Don Cayo

Who invented multiculturalism?

Selected and edited from the Inroads listserv by Harvey Schachter

THE NEW YEAR WAS ONLY A FEW DAYS OLD WHEN VANCOUVER'S Philip Resnick sent the Inroads listserv an article with what he said were intelligent reflections on the challenge of Islam, the clash of civilizations, and multiculturalism and its limits by The Observer's Will Hutton. Canadian winters are cold, and so what else is there to do but sit by your computer and share your thoughts with others? The article ignited a month-long discussion of multiculturalism and identity, looking not only at France but also at Canada and the United States, probing the similarities and differences with some trenchant observations. Here are some highlights.

From: John Furedy

I don't think Hutton's set of "reflections" is as "intelligent" as the Inroader thinks they are, but this is not the first time we have disagreed on the worth of a piece. More concretely, I suggest at least three relevant distinctions that the piece conflates, thus detracting from its "intelligence."

1. Freedom of, vs. from, religion. The French revolutionaries, successors of the French "enlightenment," tried to use the state to eliminate religion, as did Stalin (until he needed religion when overcome by Hitler's troops) and many other totalitarian regimes. In contrast, the origins of the American freedom of religion principle lie in the

persecution of colonists who did not agree with the Church of England. Of course this tolerance took time to develop, but it is clear that by the 20th century it was largely established in most Western nations.

It is this principle that France is breaking when it forbids the wearing of headscarves by Muslim girls and of yarmulkes by Jewish boys in schools. I can imagine that some people feel as uncomfortable when they see a scarf on a girl as when they see a yarmulke on a boy (many liberal Jews feel this way – they only put on a yarmulke when at a special Jewish ceremony). But institutionally both scarves and yarmulkes must be allowed if one has a modicum of regard for freedom of religion. This has little to do with "multiculturalism" (which suggests some degree of approval for certain cultural/religious beliefs). It has to do with individual rights, and the principle of freedom of religion for all individuals.

2. Hutton conflates the wearing of scarves with the practice of stoning women for adultery, where one is an expression of opinion – religious opinion – while the other is an act. This is not just a matter of "seriousness" but also a matter of distinguishing between opinions and acts. There are some cases where the opinion/act distinction is difficult to make, but the wearing of scarves is clearly an expression of opinion.

3. The fundamental distinction between a secular and a theocratic state is the degree to which state ideology impinges on indi-

vidual freedom of opinion, including religious opinion (and the beliefs of atheists and agnostics). It is interesting that the author contrasts the "West" and "Islam," where the former includes secular systems while the Islamic states are dominated by religious or theocratic systems, with no separation between church and state. No wonder some Islamic scholars approve of France's scarf-banning action: it is consistent with a theocratic view of the state.

Note also that in this view, scarf wearing will become compulsory as soon as this sort of "Islam" takes over the "West." In my view that is not the sort of "enlightenment" intellectuals in an open society should support. Rather, they should go back a bit further in time and to a different place, and consider dicta such as that of Socrates, that every assumption should be open to critical examination, and that the state should not dictate the opinions of individuals.

John Furedy is a professor of psychology at the University of Toronto.

From: Gareth Morley

Will Hutton claims that the hijab is sexist. But he doesn't give any reasons for this view. Nor does he explain why it is okay for a religious or nonreligious minority to humiliate pious schoolgirls (who may not be political at all) or how it will promote integration to force people to choose between what they perceive to be their religious duty and the benefits of public schooling.

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The debate about multiculturalism seems confused to me as well. Pretty much every society – with the possible exception of Iceland – is multicultural, in the sense that the people within it derive their identities from multiple cultural traditions. Yugoslavia and Rwanda are particularly multicultural in this sense. The key issue is what attitude the state is entitled to take with respect to these different cultures. A liberal state is one that recognizes some limits on the ability of the majority (or a privileged minority) to enforce its culture through coercion.

Reason is only relevant in the sense that the state must have some nonsectarian reason for imposing either special burdens or benefits on particular religious or nonreligious groups. A liberal state does not impose burdens on particular religious groups because their practices are not “reasonable” (i.e., explicable through deductive logic without reference to inherited tradition or divine revelation). No practices are reasonable in that sense.

Rather, the liberal state explains the burdens it imposes on the basis of some secular account of harm to others. That is what France has failed to do. Instead, it says that the hijab gives its “secularists” the willies, which is precisely an illiberal reason for distributing state benefits/burdens.

Canada is imperfect in this respect as well. Orthodox Jewish taxpayers in Ontario have to pay for Catholic schools, while Catholic taxpayers do not pay for Orthodox Jewish schools. Canada’s illiberal practice in this respect is explicable historically: a century ago, Catholics were the only major religious minority and the public schools were effectively Protestant schools. But it’s still unfair.

Gareth Morley is a Vancouver lawyer.

From: Jan Narveson

We must be clear that there are different views about the appropriate ways in which what is loosely called “religious toleration” may be “limited.” One view is the way of liberalism, which limits toleration when one person’s practices are themselves intolerant of others. The most currently spectacular example: when person X decides he has a religious duty to slaughter person Y on the ground that Y does not subscribe to the “right” religion. Toleration as a right, as a principle, inherently draws a boundary around the tolerant, and it is nonsense – inconsistent – to tolerate the intolerance of others. Intolerance of the intolerant is precisely what liberalism requires. If you allow the Bs to invade the Cs on grounds of “toleration” of the Bs, you then license intolerance toward the Cs – contrary to the general principle of toleration, which is intended to be universal (and is a fake if it isn’t).

The second view appeals to other considerations of a nonliberal sort. St. Thomas Aquinas was willing to “tolerate” the rule of infidels in some areas – unless and until we good guys could “get them,” in which case, of course, they would be brought under the rule of the True Faith. There are many other examples, among which I would list – just to goad people – egalitarianism.

Some people say: Isn’t it possible that some religious practices or rites may be so abhorrent that they ought not be tolerated? (The treatment of women by the Taliban comes to mind.) It is this especially that requires us to attend to my distinction at the outset. The Taliban example is excellent at illustrating the liberal point: tolerating the Taliban is tolerating their own extreme intolerance of women. But “abhor-

rence” is not a category that a liberal society can recognize. If you find somebody else’s beliefs or lifestyle abhorrent, that’s tough. You just have to lump it. To bring “abhorrence” into the agenda of that which society may cater to is to invite the totalitarianism of the self-appointed high-minded.

Note also that “abhorrence” has a sort of moral ring to it, but what if the abhorrence is purely esthetic? The fundamental liberal principle, in the view of Hobbes, Kant, Locke and assorted others (and me) is a Paretian nonaggression principle. The citizen (or anybody) is morally allowed to do whatever does not aggress against others – whatever, as Kant puts it, is compatible with the general liberty of all. The issue in public schools is framed by the following:

- They are tax-supported, so not just anything goes. They can’t cater to one religion as against others, for example.
- There are considerations of educational efficiency. Maybe headscarves are incompatible with that, but I don’t think so.

When manifestly specific religious symbols are, so to speak, flaunted in public places, is that inflammatory? Do we have a general right, by virtue of the aforementioned right of general liberty, not to have our eyes “assaulted” by the very public display of things we really don’t like?

Public nudity is a wonderful example of this last point. Does general liberty really mean that people can walk nude in the public square in summer, in a community where most people would be upset, even offended, by same? It is *not* obvious that they do. It is likewise not obvious that they have a right to go about dressed in a manner that is an

affront to those among their fellows who have just as good a right as any to be where they are, such as in the streets and public squares and so on.

Now, there is a matter of custom and sensibility here. The sight of special religious dress nowadays simply does not affront most of us in Canada. There would be no case for ruling out headscarves in public schools in this country, generally speaking, on anything like the ground mentioned above.

And on the other hand, among many religions, wearing distinctive dress is supposed to be a very big deal (to put this in as

Toleration as a right, as a principle, inherently draws a boundary around the tolerant, and it is nonsense – inconsistent – to tolerate the intolerance of others. Intolerance of the intolerant is precisely what liberalism requires. — Jan Narveson

vernacular a way as I can). It seems to me there is room to argue that if it is such, then we should let people dress that way in public, even in public schools, and adopt the general rule that we should indeed tolerate that.

So where are we? I do not think that we can go straight from fundamental rights to policies on headscarves. Supplementary considerations, it seems to me, suggest in favour of them, at least for many communities including ours. But as others on this list have properly pointed out, we live in a pretty different social environment from the contemporary French.

Jan Narveson is a professor of philosophy at the University of Waterloo.

From: Bob Chodos

Jan Narveson writes that “it is nonsense – inconsistent – to tolerate the intolerance of others.” He gives, as examples of what should not be tolerated, “person X deciding he has a religious duty to slaughter person Y on the ground that Y does not subscribe to the ‘right’ religion” and “the Bs invading the Cs.” Both these examples involve people of one religious (or other) group acting against people outside their group, and I think there would be general agreement on this list that “tolerance” should not extend to such actions.

Then comes another example, which Jan sees as illustrating the same point: “Tolerating the Taliban is tolerating their own extreme intolerance of women.” This case is a little different, in that it involves *Islamic*

The idea of liberalism isn’t to take sides in the cultural war, including that between Langley and Kitsilano. It is to impose multilateral disarmament.

— Gareth Morley

authorities violating the rights of *Muslim* women. Now the strain of Islam promoted by the Taliban is hardly unique in being “intolerant” toward women. Orthodox Jews, for example, consign women to a separate area of the sanctuary during services and limit their meaningful participation in worship; indeed, included in the daily prayer service for Orthodox Jewish men is a prayer that says, “Blessed are you, O God, who has not made me a woman.” The Roman Catholic Church restricts ordination to the priesthood, and therefore effective decision-making authority, to men only. Yet few people would suggest that Canada refuse to “toler-

ate” the practice of Orthodox Judaism or Roman Catholicism, or that it take the authorities of these religious traditions to court for discriminatory practices that we would not, in fact, “tolerate” in the secular world.

So what is the difference between these religious groups and the Taliban? Is it that the Taliban’s intolerance of women is “extreme,” while Roman Catholic or Orthodox Jewish intolerance of women is not? If so, then we are in subjective territory again, where “custom and sensibility” come into play and one set of rights needs to be balanced against another. Through most of his argument, Jan shows a fine sensitivity to the existence of grey areas and the inevitability of tradeoffs. I would suggest that the question of tolerating intolerance is no less subject to considerations of this sort.

Bob Chodos is a freelance writer and managing editor of *Inroads*.

From: Gareth Morley

The difference between the Taliban and the Catholic Church isn’t that one is more extreme than the other. It is that the Taliban has state power, and the Catholic Church hasn’t since the days of Cavour and Garibaldi. For practical purposes, the Catholic Church and Orthodox Judaism (leaving aside the complicated domestic politics of Israel) are limited in their coercive power to that given them by the loyalty of their adherents.

So, if I object to the Catholic Church’s official view that the sacrament of ordination is only available to men and the sacrament of marriage to previously unmarried heterosexuals, I can leave. I realize many do object, and don’t leave, but there is no way of vindicating their position other than through state interference with the church.



Muslims praying “salat tarawih.” HASIMSYAH SAMOSIR PHOTO

However, a person coerced by the Taliban into complying with their vision of the shari’ah does not have the same option.

It isn’t the extremism; it’s the coercion. The idea of liberalism isn’t to take sides in the cultural war, including that between Langley and Kitsilano. It is to impose multilateral disarmament. Everyone is allowed to associate voluntarily to further their own cultural norms; no one is allowed to use the power of the state to prevent voluntary association by people with “abhorrent” alternative norms. One of the good things about this arrangement is that it means Langley and Kitsilano don’t have to slaughter each other.

It’s amazing to me that this point is so misunderstood, even in Canada. So, for example, Paul Martin raises the bogeyman that civil recognition of same-sex marriages may lead to requiring churches to perform religious same-sex marriages. Perhaps some gay

activists aim to do this. But one doesn’t lead to the other.

From: Philip Resnick

At the risk of adding yet more fuel to the flames, I thought recent comments on the headscarf controversy by William Pfaff, a syndicated columnist for the *Los Angeles Times* and the *International Herald Tribune*, would be of interest. The novel twist – from a Canadian perspective, where we tend to think Canada invented multiculturalism – is the argument that this was essentially an American creation of the Vietnam War years. I’m not sure that Pfaff is entirely right about this. But where he may be on stronger ground is in his claim that “multiculturalism does not demonstrate self-confidence in the host society.” Speaking for myself, I have sometimes felt that the official Canadian enthusiasm for multiculturalism betrays a deeper sense of self-doubt about the

exact nature of Canadian identity. The French, as Pfaff point out, cannot be accused of having the same self-doubt about the power of their own culture.

Philip Resnick is a professor of political science at the University of British Columbia.

From: Reg Whitaker

Multiculturalism, I would submit, has absolutely nothing to do with the Vietnam War, any more than it has started with Muslim women in France wearing the hijab. And I doubt it has much to do with the official Canadian Multicultural program either. Multiculturalism is a social reality in a world of large-scale immigration, quite independent of official policies either sponsoring or opposing it.

As Nathan Glazer put it in the title of his book a few years ago: *We Are All Multiculturalists Now*. The political battles may go on, but the war is over. It will just take the Europeans a little longer than North Americans to figure this out. Younger Canadians seem to be at the forefront of grasping this reality – talk to Canadian university students these days and you quickly learn that to most of them multiculturalism is, well, obvious, and what’s all the fuss?

When immigrant groups move in large numbers from their homeland to new locations, they bring their culture with them. What a surprise. Forget melting pots vs. mosaics vs. *la France éternelle*, the reality will be pretty much the same. But these cultures do not remain static, they interact with the host culture(s) and evolve in new and unexpected ways. The host culture(s) is/are not fixed or congealed themselves, and they too grow and change, partly in response to the new strains.

Take the example of the cultural impact of writers and artists from the Indian subcontinent on both Britain (old Europe) and Canada. Writers like Salman Rushdie and Rohinton Mistry have made tremendous contributions to their host cultures, but more importantly to a new, broader global culture.

Or take two recent films, one British (*Bend it Like Beckham*) and the other Canadian (*Hollywood, Bollywood*). Both depict Indian cultures in uneasy interaction with the “White” cultures, and the gender spinoffs of these cultural conflicts, but they do so by laughing not at their subjects but with them. Above all, they are entertaining, and just plain fun. There is a vitality here that is very, very engaging.

The writers from the Indian subcontinent have been reinvigorating the English language, not unlike the way Irish writers like Joyce, Yeats, et al. reinvigorated English a century ago by seeing it through fresh eyes. Eventually the French will get it too. And, of course, when they finally do, there will be some Bernard-Henri Lévy who will declare that France invented multiculturalism.

Reg Whitaker teaches political science at the University of Victoria.

From: Garth Stevenson

I agree with Reg Whitaker’s comments on the sociological reality of multiculturalism in both North America and Europe, as well as the benefits it has conferred on both continents. I particularly enjoyed his parallel between the impact of Indian writers on the English language today and that of Irish writers a century ago. Incidentally, I find it interesting that Ireland itself, historically an exporter of people, is now attracting immigrants from all over the world and is experiencing its own version of multicultural-

ism. This is particularly noticeable in Dublin, but not only there. Generally, I am happy to report, Irish people seem to be accepting this, apart from some of the die-hard Unionists in Belfast who have recently added racist attacks on immigrants to their normal repertoire of anti-Catholic bigotry.

But while I appreciate the benefits, and acknowledge the inevitability, of multiculturalism as a sociological fact, I am not at all impressed by Multiculturalism as a state-sponsored ideology, which it seems to have become in Canada under the Liberals. Official Multiculturalism, as Gad Horowitz has suggested, downgrades Canada by suggesting that Canada has no distinctive characteristics or traditions apart from “diversity” which, as Reg points out, is not really unique to Canada at all. Yet supporters of this ideology, who seem to include most young people in southern Ontario, paradoxically often combine it with an ignorant and strident anti-Americanism, and a grotesque exaggeration of the differences between Canada and the United States. Supporters of the ideology are obsessively convinced that immigrants to the U.S. are immediately thrown into a “melting pot” from which they emerge purged of all their cultural characteristics and transformed into white bread Americans.

Could anything be more absurd? Most of the great cities of the United States were multicultural long before the Canadian ideology of Multiculturalism was more than a gleam in Mr. Trudeau’s eye. At one time more people in Milwaukee and St. Louis spoke German than spoke English. Mackenzie King commented in his diary, at a time when Reg and I were already alive, that New York, in contrast to Canadian cities, had too many unassimilated “foreigners.” Polka

music is still popular in Buffalo, where many Poles settled during the city’s heyday a century ago. Detroit has a large and flourishing Arab-American community. Old immigrant groups like the Irish and the Italians have resisted the alleged “melting pot” for generations, and newer arrivals like the Cubans, Filipinos and Koreans, not to mention the millions of Mexicans, are certainly doing so. I have seen no convincing evidence that immigrants to the United States “assimilate” any faster than immigrants to Canada, still less that U.S. policy forces them to do so.

So let us enjoy the contributions of immigrants to Canadian society, as long as we don’t arrogantly and ignorantly pretend to

Eventually the French will get it too. And, of course, when they finally do, there will be some Bernard-Henri Lévy who will declare that France invented multiculturalism. — Reg Whitaker

have invented something that just happened. Perhaps it is not only the French and the Americans who insist “that anything of significance in the world originated with them.” Or, as Harold Innis said long ago, every Canadian apparently needs an arm long enough to pat himself on the back.

Garth Stevenson is professor and chairman of the Department of Political Science at Brock University.

From: Jan Narveson

It is rather noticeable that there is often talk – wistful, perhaps? – of the “Canadian identity.” I rather think that most Canadians – not perhaps most Canadian intellectuals of the prominent sort – don’t really think there is a very significant “Canadian identity”

apart from the somewhat culturally distinctive subparts of the country, at which level there is quite a lot.

I was born and raised in America, although I have been in Canada for 40 years now. Here's a question put especially to the many of you who have travelled extensively in, or perhaps lived in, the United States for a while: Is there more of an "American identity" than a "Canadian identity"? There is plenty of regional variation in the U.S. to be sure, and not only among assorted immigrant communities with strong continuing attachments to their roots. I'll venture the thought that there is either no appreciable extra component of "Americanness" about Americans, over and above regional variations, compared to the "Canadianness" of Canadians, or at least very little.

When I travel in France, Germany, or even the U.K., I do have a strong impression of "national identity." But maybe that's just because they're all so different from us, and of course because of the languages. From their point of view, perhaps we are as distinctive as they. But do they have a strong impression of difference between Yanks and Canucks?

From: Reg Whitaker

We don't need to rely entirely on anecdotal and personal evidence with respect to Canadian and American national and regional identities. An excellent empirical source on this is Michael Adams's *Fire and Ice: The U.S., Canada, and the Myth of Converging Values*. On key indicators of social values that measure hot-button issues like patriarchy (agreeing or disagreeing that "father knows best"), the gap between the most conservative and liberal regions in Canada was actually quite small, while it was seven times wider in the

U.S. – a huge gap. Adams notes the irony that Canada, where regional differences are constantly pointed to and celebrated, and where votes on secession take place, actually exhibits relatively uniform values, while the nationalist and unitary United States is really much more diverse.

Of course, regional value diversity in itself does not necessarily indicate anything definitive about the strength of "national identity," which may well draw on other sources that override regional differences, and here the U.S. clearly is more centralist in focus, especially in terms of its imperial foreign policy and emphasis on American power projected abroad. But I suspect that the relative uniformity of values across Canada also forms an interesting subtext to national politics, however skewed publicly toward regional conflicts.

Thus, the remarkable degree of consensus that quickly formed around the Chrétien government's refusal to participate in the invasion of Iraq, a consensus that clearly constricts the capacity of Paul Martin to move too visibly into Bush's orbit and handcuffs the Conservatives in trying to stake out a distinctive position. There is a consensus Canadian identity on this issue, and it is in sharp contrast to the consensus American identity.

On the wider issue of multiculturalism, for some time I have been trying to make clear a distinction between capital-*M* and small-*m* multiculturalism. The former is official state policy and programs, largely a partisan political tool for channelling taxpayer dollars (although not in truth that many dollars) into places where they will benefit the ruling party and serve symbolic political purposes (Sheila Copps's efforts to legitimize political correctness). This Multiculturalism is pretty useless and beside the

point, and I agree with Garth. Small-*m* multiculturalism is simply social and cultural reality, that governments, media, academics and the public will simply have to come to terms with, eventually, whatever the policy framework in place. At the end of the day, this is one area where the state is really out of the loop and irrelevant.

From: Bob Chodos

Reg mentions "imperial foreign policy and emphasis on American power projected abroad" as one factor in creating a national identity in the United States that is overlaid on the various regional identities. I would like to mention two others. One is postsecondary education. On the basis of anecdotal evidence (friends and relatives in the U.S.) there appears to be a greater tendency than in Canada for people to go to university outside their state or region (and for leading universities to recruit students from different parts of the country).

The second is the media, which don't play quite the same role in Canada because national Canadian media (at least in English Canada) are something of a minority taste. I can remember an incident that occurred about a quarter-century ago, when I was living in Massachusetts, that illustrated this overlay for me. I attended a conference of Americans of French background – primarily New England Franco-Americans and Louisiana Cajuns – at the University of Southwest Louisiana in Lafayette. Landing in Lafayette after the flight from Boston, I felt that I had crossed a much more significant border than the one that separates New England from Canada. The nature of the conference only highlighted southwest Louisiana's cultural distinctiveness. After being immersed in this atmosphere for

about three days, I turned on the television in my hotel room and was taken aback to find that it looked and sounded exactly the same as it did back home. On one level, Massachusetts and Louisiana were worlds apart; on another, they were both part of a very real America.

From: Garth Stevenson

I agree with Jan that there is great regional as well as ethnic diversity in the U.S. The South, where I spent the year 1992–93, is still very different from the rest of the country, and has a strong regional identity. In fact in some ways there is more difference between the northern and southern states than there is between the northern states and anglophone Canada.

What I think ties it all together, and constitutes the American identity, is a very

In some ways there is more difference between the northern and southern states than there is between the northern states and anglophone Canada. — Reg Whitaker

strong devotion to their unique political institutions, which have never really been successfully replicated elsewhere, and to the ideals expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, including the first ten amendments which Americans call the Bill of Rights. Virtually all Americans, left or right, White or Black, Christian or Jewish, or whatever, are convinced that those are the best possible institutions and political ideals and that they are a model for the rest of the world, even though, as I suggest above, efforts to replicate them elsewhere have not produced impressive results.

Americans find it difficult even to conceive of living under any other kind of system than the one they know. Americanism is fundamentally a political, rather than a cultural, identity. (That, of course, was the point of the much-derided Committee on Un-American Activities which Congress established in the 1930s, and which flourished during the Cold War.) Even the southerners who tried to secede from the Union in 1861 established a constitution for their Confederate States of America that was remarkably similar to that of the Union from which they were attempting to secede.

I would suggest that if we have, or wish to have, an equally strong Canadian identity, it must also be political in character. After all, what really distinguishes Canada is not really the weather (Buffalo's is just as bad, or worse) and not scenery (Vermont looks much like Quebec, and Michigan much like Ontario) and not really ethnicity or culture (both countries are cultural mosaics). What distinguishes Canada from the U.S. is our system of parliamentary responsible government, a weak upper house, judges and prosecutors appointed by the crown, and so forth, plus some institutional features added later, of which official bilingualism is the most important.

We need to remember that the border was originally an ideological truce line in a civil war, much like the boundary between North and South Korea, and not a boundary between two cultural nations like Germany and France or even England and Scotland.

From: Patrick Coleman

Bob and Garth make good points about the American identity. I would add, in relation to military power, the influence of a draft (in the past) and the still very significant

participation in the military as a national identity builder. Not only in the mixing of regions and races, but in the opportunity for collective grieving of the dead. This is surely an issue to be studied across the board.

Before 9/11, there was Oklahoma City, and in the U.K., the death of Princess Diana. In Canada, even commemorations of the two world wars have not served as social cement, given the French-English split in this regard. Events such as the death of Terry Fox (remarkable in its day for the way it brought out "national" feeling) don't have the same enduring effect.

Patrick Coleman is professor of French and Francophone Studies at the University of California at Los Angeles and editor of the journal *Québec Studies*.

From: Joe Murray

I have seen some literature on the development of national identities, especially in former European colonies, that emphasizes the development of an elite with a shared sense of identity based on frequent interactions, often determined by available career paths. This is part of the reason regional administrative boundaries became the basis of national borders in areas like Central and South America. Despite all the talk about Canada as a globalized and cosmopolitan country, there are significant differences between the circles in which elites move in Canada and in the U.S.

One is a hyperpower where elites in all sectors – cultural, scientific, business, government, military – dominate the world in their respective areas. Now that the U.S. is head and shoulders above all other potential great powers, Canada has, arguably, become a third-tier power in most of these

sectors. By third-tier I don't mean that it is third-rate, just that our size means that we are so far from taking our domination of the world in any of these sectors for granted that we are proud when "we" lead the world in some small part of one of these sectors, like leading a multinational force in a mop-up stage in Afghanistan for a little while, or having Nortel in with the big telecom equipment players for a while, or getting a Nobel, or having Celine Dion become the best-selling female recording artist of all time.

A second important factor is media markets. Before the advent of mass media the education and reading habits of elites were more dominant, I would guess. Now, though, mass opinions are formed in large measure by exposure to mass media rather than "unmediated" interactions with other members of one's local community. U.S. mass media markets are remarkably parochial in their preferences for American-generated content.

That is not to say that coverage of international affairs is thinner there than here – it's much more extensive as befits their current significant engagement in all regions of the world. Rather, Americans are much less likely to watch a foreign-produced newscast or read a foreign newspaper. If I am not mistaken, Canadians – or more particularly English Canadians – imbibe more foreign cultural content per capita than any other nationality, and especially the most from one other country. This difference is an important cause, I believe, of Canadians' propensity to be the same yet other than Americans, and to tend to define themselves in contrast to Americans. The converse – Americans defining themselves and their identity in contrast to Canadians – just doesn't happen.

In the political domain the effects are obvious. Voting pattern differences often track the boundaries of media markets, for example between southern and northern and eastern Ontario. Some of this is due to advertising buys while some of it is the editorial content and news coverage. One significant cause, but obviously not the only one, of the differences between Quebec and English Canada in areas like social and political values or support for the Iraq war is the differential influence of media content from France versus media content from the United States. I am not very versed in regional and local media in the U.S., but I would argue that some of the differences in regional identities in Canada is reflected in

Americans find it difficult even to conceive of living under any other kind of system than the one they know. Americanism is fundamentally a political, rather than a cultural, identity. — Garth Stevenson

and due to regional and local media influences. A west coast talk show host can make a big difference in B.C. referendum results without causing a blip in Ontario polls.

Joe Murray is principal of JMA Consulting, providers of strategic and policy advice and services on information and communications technologies to public, NGO and private clients.

From: Jan Narveson

When I came to Canada 40 years ago, my general impression was of a nation of awfully nice people who weren't in much of a flap about "being Canadian." By and large, I think, that's still true – and still very nice. ■